Deduplicated
Hits with the same fingerprint, or the same file, line and rule, collapse to one finding. Agreement between tools becomes a corroborating edge, not a second row.
Follow untrusted input through your code with static application security testing. See the path from source to sink, with evidence your developers can act on.
Follow the input through functions instead of reviewing an isolated pattern match.
Keep the source location and data-flow evidence together for developer investigation.
Review the finding, propose a change and retain a reason for any disposition.
nosec suppresses nothing.SAST reads code, not a running application, so it can run on every pull request before anything is deployed. Its weakness is noise: a pattern match on a dangerous function call fires whether or not attacker-controlled data ever reaches it. Taint analysis narrows that by tracking data flow, and the quality of a SAST tool is mostly how well it follows that flow across functions and files, and how honestly it credits sanitisers. See the SAST glossary entry for how the term is used across this site.
SecurityVault goes further than the flow. Each taint finding lands on one graph that runs from code to build artifact to cloud workload, so you can see whether the vulnerable handler ships in an image that is running today. A fail-closed gate stops it before merge, and the source-to-sink path is kept as evidence. Developers get fewer findings they can verify; AppSec gets a gate it can defend.
Follow the value entering a handler.
Inspect the call path into the sink.
Keep the source reference with the affected build.
A source match starts an investigation; evidence establishes the context.
DEBUG = True fifty lines above app.run(debug=DEBUG) still counts. In the JavaScript and TypeScript model a sanitiser clears only the sink category it actually neutralises: an HTML escaper does not clear a SQL injection.It becomes one node on the same graph as your dependencies, images and workloads, tied to the commit it was found in.
Hits with the same fingerprint, or the same file, line and rule, collapse to one finding. Agreement between tools becomes a corroborating edge, not a second row.
Source findings can be reviewed alongside dependency and API-route context. These relationships help prioritise investigation; a static match alone does not prove that a vulnerable function executes or that an attack succeeds.
Each taint finding exposes its source-to-sink path. Remediation comes from deterministic templates first; AI assistance is offered only where a rule family opts in.
Yes, and the gate fails closed. A pull-request or pipeline gate evaluates the scan's findings against your severity threshold and organisation policies. A scan that times out or fails is a deny, not a pass, and an evaluator error is a deny. Results go back to the pull request as SARIF and annotated comments through a per-organisation rate limit. From a pipeline, esos --fail-on high ci scan exits non-zero on a policy failure and with a different code on an API error, so an outage is never mistaken for a clean result. See deployment gates, the CLI reference and why severity counts alone make weak gates.
Yes. Every SAST finding carries its CWE identifier and is recorded as static-analysis evidence when your controls are evaluated, and an open critical or high finding shows as a gap against the controls it touches. The cross-walk maps that evidence across 6 seeded framework catalogues, including SOC 2, ISO 27001 and PCI DSS, so the secure-development controls in your own audit are backed by scan records rather than screenshots. See continuous compliance.
SAST is strongest beside the scans that share its graph: dependency reachability with SCA, secrets detection on the same checkout, and DAST findings matched by route. Built for AppSec teams and developers fixing in the pull request. Weighing options? Read software composition analysis, or start with the quickstart.
One scan, the native engine and the open-source tools together, and a source-to-sink path on a real finding.